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The focus of this paper is to analyze whether the unreliability of results related to cer-
tain controversial psychological phenomena may be a consequence of their low statistical
power. Applying the Null Hypothesis StatisticalTesting (NHST), still thewidest used statisti-
cal approach, unreliability derives from the failure to refute the null hypothesis, in particular
when exact or quasi-exact replications of experiments are carried out. Taking as example
the results of meta-analyses related to four different controversial phenomena, sublimi-
nal semantic priming, incubation effect for problem solving, unconscious thought theory,
and non-local perception, it was found that, except for semantic priming on categorization,
the statistical power to detect the expected effect size (ES) of the typical study, is low or
very low. The low power in most studies undermines the use of NHST to study phenom-
ena with moderate or low ESs. We conclude by providing some suggestions on how to
increase the statistical power or use different statistical approaches to help discriminate
whether the results obtained may or may not be used to support or to refute the reality of
a phenomenon with small ES.
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INTRODUCTION
ARE THERE ELUSIVE PHENOMENA OR IS THERE AN “ELUSIVE” POWER
TO DETECT THEM?
When may a phenomenon be considered to be real or very
probable, following the rules of current scientific methodology?
Among the many requirements, there is a substantial consen-
sus that replication is one of the more fundamental (Schmidt,
2009). In other words, a phenomenon may be considered real
or very probable when it has been observed many times and
preferably by different people or research groups. Whereas a
failure to replicate is quite expected in the case of conceptual
replication, or when the experimental procedure or materials
entail relevant modifications, a failure in the case of an exact
or quasi-exact replication, give rise to serious concerns about
the reality of the phenomenon under investigation. This is the
case in the four phenomena used as examples in this paper,
namely, semantic subliminal priming, incubation effects on prob-
lem solving,unconscious thought,and non-local perception (NLP;
e.g., Kennedy, 2001; Pratte and Rouder, 2009; Waroquier et al.,
2009).
The focus of this paper is to demonstrate that for all phenomena
with a moderate or small effect size (ES), approximately below 0.5
if we refer to standardized differences such as Cohen’s d, the typical
study shows a power level insufficient to detect the phenomenon
under investigation.
Given that the majority of statistical analyses are based on the
Null Hypothesis Statistical Testing (NHST) frequentist approach,
their failure is determined by the rejection of the (nil) null hypoth-
esis H0, usually setting α< 0.05. Even if this procedure is consid-
ered incorrect because the frequentist approach only supports H0
rejection and not H0 validity1, it may be tolerated if there is proof
of a high level of statistical power as recommended in the recent
APA statistical recommendations [American Psychological Asso-
ciation, APA (2010)]: “Power: When applying inferential statistics,
take seriously the statistical power considerations associated with
the tests of hypotheses. Such considerations relate to the likeli-
hood of correctly rejecting the tested hypotheses, given a particular
alpha level, ES, and sample size. In that regard, routinely provide
evidence that the study has sufficient power to detect effects of sub-
stantive interest. Be similarly careful in discussing the role played
by sample size in cases in which not rejecting the null hypoth-
esis is desirable (i.e., when one wishes to argue that there are no
differences), when testing various assumptions underlying the sta-
tistical model adopted (e.g., normality, homogeneity of variance,
homogeneity of regression), and in model fitting. pag. 30.”
HOWMUCH POWER?
Statistical power depends on three classes of parameters: (1) the
significance level (i.e., the Type I error probability) of the test, (2)
the size(s) of the sample(s) used for the test, and (3) an ES para-
meter defining H1 and thus indexing the degree of deviation from
H0 in the underlying population.
Power analysis should be used prospectively to calculate the
minimum sample size required so that one can reasonably detect
an effect of a given size. Power analysis can also be used to calculate
1The line of reasoning from “the null hypothesis is false” to “the theory is therefore
true” involves the logical fallacy of affirming the consequent: “If the theory is true,
the null hypothesis will prove to be false. The null hypothesis proved to be false;
therefore, the theory must be true” (Nickerson, 2000).
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the minimum ES that is likely to be detected in a study using a given
sample size.
In most experimental designs, the accepted probability of mak-
ing a Type I error is α= 0.05 and the desired power is not less
than 0.80. However, in order to define how to obtain such a level
of power, it is necessary to know the ES of the phenomena being
identified. It is intuitive that the smaller the phenomenon, the
greater should be the means to detect it. This analogy is similar to
the signal/noise relationship. The smaller the signal, the stronger
must be the means to detect it in the noise. In psychological exper-
iments, these means are the number of participants taking part in
the study and the number of trials they are requested to perform.
Given that Power= 1−β= ES∗√N/SD∗ α, if we know the esti-
mated ES of a phenomenon, after the definition of the desired
power and the α level, the only free parameters is N, that is the
number of participants or trials.
A review of 322 meta-analyses published before 1998, summa-
rizing 25,000 studies referred to 474 social psychological effects,
reports that the mean ES reported is r = 0.21 and the mode was less
than r = 0.10 (Richard et al., 2003). For this observed mean ES, to
obtain a statistical power for independent sample t tests=>0.9,
the sample size for each group should be at least 90, a number
rarely observed in the studies.
Setting aside the strong criticisms of the use of NHST (Cohen,
1994; Kline, 2004), a neglected aspect of this approach, is the con-
trol of how much statistical power is necessary to detect what the
researcher aims to find2.
This problem is not new and has already been raised by
Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer (1989), Cohen (1992), Bezeau and
Graves (2001), and Maxwell (2004) among others. However
the widespread adherence to “The Null Ritual” as discussed by
Gigerenzer et al. (2004), which consists in: (a) Set up a statistical
null hypothesis of “no mean difference” or “zero correlation.” (b)
Don’t specify the predictions of your research hypothesis or of
any alternative substantive hypotheses; (c) Use 5% as a conven-
tion for rejecting the null; (d) If significant, accept your research
hypothesis (e) Always perform this procedure, seems to prevent
most researchers taking into account such fundamental statistical
parameter. In Gigerenzer et al. (2004) check, covering the years
2000–2002, and encompassing with some 220 empirical articles,
only nine researchers who computed the power of their tests were
found.
Using the results of four recent meta-analyses related to “con-
troversial” or “elusive” psychological phenomena, we illustrate the
importance of using the available ESs to derive the appropriate
number of participants to achieve a power=>0.90. Only if a
replication fails with this level of power, it is legitimate to raise
doubts about the reality of the phenomena under investigation.
CAN SUBLIMINALLY PRESENTED INFORMATION INFLUENCE
BEHAVIOR?
This question is one of the most controversial questions in psychol-
ogy and it remains an intriguing and strongly debated issue. Apart
from the controversies relating to the controls that information
2Even if power estimate is important in meta-analyses (i.e., Valentine et al., 2009),
in this paper we focus only on power estimates in single studies.
(priming) was effectively masked and the identification of serious
methodological flaws which caused great doubt as to the existence
of subliminal processing, the debate is even hotter around the topic
of the level of influence of this unconscious (subliminal) informa-
tion. Hitherto, the debate as to whether subliminal priming reflects
genuine semantic processing of the subliminal information or the
formation of automatic S–R mappings remains unresolved.
The meta-analysis of Van den Bussche et al. (2009) tried to
shed light on these questions by analyzing all the available litera-
ture between 1983 and December 2006. Their analysis was carried
out separately from the two most studied protocols, subliminal
priming for semantic categorization and subliminal priming for
lexical decision and naming. If semantic subliminal priming facil-
itated the subsequent categorization of targets belonging to the
same semantic category, it suggests that the primes were uncon-
sciously categorized and processed semantically. The same effect is
postulated if lexical decision and naming are faster or more accu-
rate to semantically subliminal related prime–target pairs than to
unrelated pairs. A naming task is similar to the lexical decision task
except that the targets are all words, and participants are asked to
name the targets aloud.
The synthesis of the main results is reported in Table 1.
DOES INCUBATION ENHANCE PROBLEM SOLVING?
The “incubation period” is the temporary shift away from an
unsolved problem in order to allow a solution to emerge in the
mind of the individual, seemingly with no additional effort, after
he or she has put the problem aside for a period of time, having
failed in initial attempts to solve it.
Among the questions under debate there is the problem of
whether the nature of the discovery of the solution is really uncon-
scious and if it is qualitatively different from that used to tackle
problems that do not require such insight.
The meta-analysis of Sio and Ormerod (2009) tried to shed light
on this and other related questions, analyzing all the available liter-
ature from 1964 to 2007. The main findings of their meta-analysis
are reported in Table 1.
UNCONSCIOUS THOUGHT THEORY
The key assumption of Unconscious Thought Theory (UTT, Dijk-
sterhuis et al., 2006) is that unconscious thought and conscious
thought are characterized by different processes. That is, “uncon-
scious thought” processes have a relatively large capacity – hence,
they allow for an optimal decision strategy in which all attributes
of chosen alternatives are weighted according to their importance.
These unconscious processes require time, therefore the quality
of decisions increases with the duration of unconscious thought.
“Conscious thought” processes on the other hand, have a small
capacity and therefore only allow for simplified decision making
strategies. As summarized by Dijksterhuis et al., 2006, p. 105):
“When a decision strategy warrants the careful and strict appli-
cation of one specific rule, as in a lexicographic strategy, use
conscious thought. When matters become more complicated and
weighting is called for, as in the weighting strategy, use unconscious
thought.”
As expected, among the questions raised by this theory, a criti-
cal problem is whether really optimal decisions are obtained after
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Table 1 | Descriptive statistics of the four meta-analyses, related to Unconscious Semantic Priming, Incubation effect, UTT, and NLP with the
estimated power of a typical study, the mean and 95% CI power calculated from all studies included in the meta-analysis and the number of
participants necessary to obtain a Power=0.90.
Phenomena Protocols Source N
studies
Averaged
N × study
(range)
ES*
(mean and
95% CI)
p Estimated
power of
a typical
study
Observed
power
(mean and
95% CI)
Estimated
N to
achieve
power=0.90
Semantic
priming
Semantic
categorization
Van den
Bussche et
al. (2009)
23 20 (6–80) 0.80±0.2 n.a. 0.96 0.90 (±1.7)
Lexical and
naming
Van den
Bussche et
al. (2009)
32 33 (9–132) 0.47±0.11 n.a. 0.84 0.69 (±0.4.6) 40
Incubation
effect
Sio and
Ormerod
(2009)
117 31 (7–278) 0.29±0.09 n.a. 0.21 0.43 (±3.3) 100
Unconscious
thought theory
Strick et al.
(2011)
92 26 (14–55) 0.22±0.08 1.2×10−8 0.20§ 0.19 (±0.72) 400§
Non-local
perception
Remote Vision Milton
(1997)
78 34 (1–74) 0.16±0.06 6×10−9 0.55 n.a. 73
Ganzfeld Storm et al.
(2010)
108 40 (7–128) 0.13±0.04 8.3×10−11 0.46 0.45 (±3.8) 110
Forced-choice
with normal state
of consciousness
Storm et al.
(in press)
72 128 (12–887) 0.011±0.004 5.3×10−7 0.07 0.065 (±0.81) 3450
*Random effect Cohen’s d; §two groups comparison.
a period of distraction from deliberate conscious mental activity
for the same amount of time as would be the case had the decisions
been taken deliberately.
The meta-analysis of Strick et al. (2011), aimed to give an
answer to this and other related questions by analyzing all the
available evidence up to May 2011. The main findings are reported
in Table 1.
NON-LOCAL PERCEPTION
Non-local perception (NLP) is based on the hypothesis that the
human mind may have quantum like properties, that is, that some
of its functions, such as perceptual abilities, reasoning, etc., may
be analyzed using quantum formalism.
The main non-local properties which are studied within the
realm of quantum physics and which are supported by “extraor-
dinary evidence” (see Genovese, 2005, 2010), are “entanglement”
and“measurement interference.”The first property, entanglement,
allows two or more physical objects to behave as one even if they
are separated in space and time. This “strange” property allows
a form of immediate communication of the objects’ character-
istics over distances between or among the entangled objects, as
has been observed in teleportation experiments (i.e., Bouwmeester
et al., 1997). The possibility that quantum-like properties may be
observed not only in physics but also even in biology and psy-
chology has not only been studied theoretically (von Lucadou
et al., 2007; Khrennikov, 2010; Walach and von Stillfried, 2011)
but also experimentally (see Gutiérrez et al., 2010 for biology and
Busemeyer et al., 2011, for psychology).
One of the main concerns about the studies related to different
aspects of NLP, is their inconsistency in obtaining results satisfying
the statistical cut off criteria to refute the null hypothesis that extra
sensory perception does not exist, usually setting α< 0.05.
This problem is recognized by some researchers involved in this
field of research (Kennedy, 2001) and even more by all deniers of
NLP evidence (e.g., Alcock, 2003).
The main findings of three meta-analysis related to three NLP
different protocols, Remote Vision, that is NLP using a free-choice
response (Milton, 1997), NLP in a Ganzfeld state using free-choice
response (Storm et al., 2010) and NLP in a normal state of con-
sciousness using a forced-choice response (Storm et al., in press),
covering all evidence available from 1964 to 1992, 1974 to 2009,
and 1987 to 2010 respectively, are reported in Table 1
POWER ESTIMATION
A synthesis of the descriptive statistics related to the four phenom-
ena described above is presented in Table 1 in decreasing order of
magnitude of ESs. For each meta-analysis, the retrospective sta-
tistical power with α= 0.05, achieved by a typical study using the
mean of the number of participants of all studies included in the
meta-analysis was estimated.
For all but one meta-analysis, it was also possible to calcu-
late the mean and 95% CI post hoc power, using the number of
participants of each study included in the meta-analyses and the
estimated random ES, setting α= 0.05.
Furthermore, for each of the four psychological phenom-
ena, the number of participants necessary to obtain a statistical
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power= 0.9 with α= 0.05 given the observed random ESs, was
estimated.
Statistical power was calculated using the software G∗Power
(Faul et al., 2007).
COMMENT
The results are quite clear: apart from the unconscious semantic
priming for semantic categorization, where the number of partic-
ipants in a typical experiment is sufficient to obtain a statistical
power above 0.90, for all remaining phenomena, to achieve this
level of power, it is necessary to increase the number of partici-
pants in a typical study, from a minimum of seven participants for
the unconscious semantic priming for lexical decision and nam-
ing to around 3400 to investigate NLP using the forced-choice with
normal state of consciousness protocol.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The response to the question posed in the introduction, as to
whether there are elusive phenomena or an elusive power to detect
them, is quite clear. If there are clear estimates of ESs from the
evidence of the phenomenon derived from a sufficient number
of studies analyzed meta-analytically and their values are moder-
ate or low, it is mandatory to increase the number of participants
to achieve a statistical power of 0.90, with the inevitable conse-
quence of investing more time and money into each study before
interpreting the results as support for reality or unreality of a
phenomenon.
Are there alternatives to this obligation? Yes, and we briefly illus-
trate some of these, also providing references for those interested
in using them.
CONFIDENCE INTERVALS
In line with the statistical reform movement (i.e.,Cumming,2012),
in the APA manual (American Psychological Association, APA,
2010), there are the following statistical recommendations “Alter-
natively, (to the use of NHST) use calculations based on a chosen
target precision (confidence interval width) to determine sample
sizes. Use the resulting confidence intervals to justify conclusions
concerning ESs (e.g., that some effect is negligibly small) p. 30.”
EQUIVALENCE TESTING
Equivalence tests are inferential statistics designed to provide
evidence for a null hypothesis. Like effect tests, the nil–null is
eschewed in equivalence testing. However unlike standard NHST,
equivalence tests provide evidence that there is little difference
or effect. A significant result in an equivalence test means that
the hypothesis that the effects or differences are substantial can be
rejected. Hence, equivalence tests are appropriate when researchers
want to show little difference or effect (Levine et al., 2008).
EVALUATING INFORMATIVE HYPOTHESES
Evaluating specific expectations directly produces more useful
results than sequentially testing traditional null hypotheses against
catch-all rivals. Researchers are often interested in the evaluation
of informative hypotheses and already know that the traditional
null hypothesis is an unrealistic hypothesis. This presupposes that
prior knowledge is often available; if this is not the case, testing the
traditional null hypothesis is appropriate. In most applied stud-
ies, however, prior knowledge is indeed available in the form of
specific expectations about the ordering of statistical parameters
(Kuiper and Hoijtink, 2010; Van de Schoot et al., 2011).
BAYESIAN APPROACH
Another alternative is to abandon the frequentist approach and
use a Bayesian one (Wagenmakers et al., 2011). With a Bayesian
approach the problem of statistical power is substituted with para-
meter estimation and/or model comparison (Kruschke, 2011). In
the first approach, assessing null values, the analyst simply sets
up a range of candidate values, including the null value, and uses
Bayesian inference to compute the relative credibility of all the
candidate values. In the model comparison approach, the ana-
lyst sets up two competing models of what values are possible.
One model posits that only the null value is possible whereas the
alternative model posits that a broad range of other values is also
possible. Bayesian inference is used to compute which model is
more credible, given the data.
FINAL COMMENT
Is there a chance to abandon “The Null Ritual” in the near future
and to think of science as cumulative knowledge? The answer is
“yes”if we approach scientific discovery thinking meta-analytically
(Cumming, 2012), that is, simply reporting observed (standard-
ized) ES and the corresponding confidence intervals, both when
NHST is refuted and when it is not refuted (Nickerson, 2000;
American Psychological Association, APA, 2010) without drawing
dichotomous decisions. The statistical approaches listed above are
good tools to achieve this goal.
How many editors and reviewers are committed to pursuing it?
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